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The Ebola virus disease outbreak in west Africa is pivotal for the worldwide health system. Just as the depth of the crisis
ultimately spurred an unprecedented response, the failures of leadership suggest the need for innovative reforms. Such
reforms would transform the existing worldwide health system architecture into a purposeful, organised system with
an empowered, highly capable WHO at its apex and enduring, equitable national health systems at its foundation. It
would be designed not only to provide security against epidemic threats, but also to meet everyday health needs, thus
realising the right to health. This retrospective and prospective analysis oﬀers a template for these reforms, responding
to the profound harms posed by fragile national health systems, delays in the international response, deﬁcient resource
mobilisation, ill deﬁned responsibilities, and insuﬃcient coordination. The scope of the reforms should address failures
in the Ebola response, and entrenched weaknesses that enabled the epidemic to reach its heights.

Introduction
The Ebola virus disease outbreak in west Africa aﬀected
impoverished post-conﬂict countries with weak health
systems and no experience with Ebola. The location
could hardly have been worse. The initial outbreak
occurred near Guinea’s border with Liberia and Sierra
Leone, enabling rapid transnational spread. Unsafe
burial practices became “underground transmission
chains”,1 and, for the ﬁrst time, the virus became
embedded in congested urban areas.
The unfamiliarity of Ebola delayed its detection. In
December, 2013, Ebola ﬁrst appeared in a 2-year-old
child,2 but Guinean health oﬃcials misdiagnosed initial
cases and Ebola was not conﬁrmed in Guinea until
March 21, 2014, and in Liberia 2 days later (see ﬁgure
appendix).3 In Sierra Leone, scientists suspected Ebola,4
but their information did not reach surveillance teams
and Ebola remained unconﬁrmed until late May. These
missed initial diagnoses and a second wave of Ebola that
hit Liberia in June were ultimately linked to the funeral
of a traditional healer in Guinea in March.4
In states rife with corruption and low health literacy,
distrust of government and health workers was
pervasive, and exacerbated by the early methods of
response. Health workers arrived in unfamiliar,
spacesuit-like clothing, frightening residents. The ill
were removed from their communities, sometimes
never to be seen again. In August, 2014, Liberia
deployed the military to enforce a cordon sanitaire in
West Point, Monrovia, provoking violence.5 A month
later, Sierra Leone declared a 3-day curfew, a so-called
lockdown, using it as an opportunity for house-to-house
education. In Guinea, rumours persisted that the
government had fabricated Ebola as a ploy to gain
humanitarian aid.6 Patients were stigmatised,
undermining crucial opportunities to use the resource
that survivors could be to their communities.7,8 The
governments’ early actions were the wrong way to
change behaviour. Families hid feverish individuals,

unsafe burial practices persisted, and there was violence
against health workers, educators, and police.6,9
By late June, 2014, Ebola was conﬁrmed in 60 locations
across three countries, with cases rising exponentially,
and health workers were dying in large numbers.10 Yet
the international machinery did not move into higher
gear until late July, after the medical evacuation of two
US aid workers from Liberia. By this point, the disease
had spread to the Nigerian megacity of Lagos, provoking
fears of unmitigated disaster. The polio vaccination
infrastructure in Nigeria was re-purposed, rapidly
containing the outbreak.11 In the ensuing months,
Ebola spread to Senegal, Mali, the USA, and the UK,
but was controlled.
WHO issued a regional plan, asking the international
community to ﬁll a US$71 million gap,12 the ﬁrst in a
succession of rising cost estimates, reaching $988 million
in a UN appeal in mid-September.13 Controversy arose
over the ethical allocation of therapies after several
Americans and a Spanish national, rather than west
Africans, received doses of the scarce ZMapp, an
experimental biopharmaceutical.
It was not until Aug 8, 2014—4·5 months after the ﬁrst
international spread—that the WHO Director-General
declared a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern (PHEIC) under the 2005 International Health
Regulations (IHR), a global treaty.14 Yet Médecins Sans
Frontières had warned on June 21 that Ebola was “out of
control”, calling for a “massive deployment of resources”.10
WHO’s staﬀ recognised the urgency of the crisis, but
expressed concern about the economic and political
ramiﬁcations for the aﬀected states.15
International donations ﬁnally began to ﬂow, with the
largest contributions from the World Bank and the USA.
Building on historical ties, US assistance focused on
Liberia, British assistance on Sierra Leone, and French
assistance on Guinea. On Sept 16, 2014, President Obama
mobilised military assets—3000 troops to support logistics,
train health workers, and build 17 treatment centres.
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2 days later, the UN Security Council passed an
unprecedented resolution calling Ebola a threat to
international peace and security, urging an escalated
response and an end to travel restrictions, which several
states had enacted.16 The next day, the UN SecretaryGeneral announced the UN Mission for Emergency Ebola
Response (UNMEER) to lead operations in the region.17
Fear increased in October when the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) posited a worst-case
scenario of 1·4 million infections by mid-January, 2015.18
Travel bans and ﬂight suspensions harmed fragile
economies and hampered the ﬂow of trade and aid. On
Sept 30, public fear intensiﬁed in the USA when health
workers in Dallas, TX, diagnosed Ebola in a traveller
originating in Liberia.19 Two Dallas nurses contracted the
virus. Soon thereafter, a medical worker returning from
Guinea to New York City was diagnosed with Ebola.20
President Obama resisted calls for a travel ban, but erected
rigorous entry screening, and several states quarantined
health workers returning from the region.21
Yet the global response was taking hold, and
communities mobilised, leading to substantial changes in
behaviour. By Dec 1, 2014, in most of the region UNMEER
reached its targets of 70% safe burials and 70% of new
patients with Ebola in treatment facilities.22 The US
Congress passed the President’s emergency appropriation
of $5·4 billion.23 By February, international contributions
neared $5 billion from 70 countries,24,25 although UNMEER
reported a shortfall of nearly $1 billion through June 2015.26
The world would soon embark on the next phase of
“getting to zero”—no new cases.27 Having peaked in
September, Liberia’s new cases fell to fewer than ten per
week in January, with one new case in March. After a
spike in November and December, new cases in Sierra
Leone declined signiﬁcantly, with progress in Guinea,
although distrust continued to hinder the response
there.28,29 Until there are zero cases, the epidemic is not
over. Reasonable concerns persist that Ebola could become
endemic in Guinea and Sierra Leone, or re-emerge in
Liberia. There remains the crucial task of recovery and
development, because Ebola has devastated the region.

and shared responsibility to build core capacities.
Although our lens is pandemic preparedness, system
capabilities should extend to the full range of health needs.

National health systems: a strong foundation
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea have among the
world’s weakest health systems, shown by the severe
shortage of health workers. International recommended
thresholds for doctors, nurses, and midwives range from
223 (WHO) to 345 (International Labour Organization)
per 100 000 population.31 The Ebola-aﬀected countries
have about one-ﬁfth to less than one-tenth of these
recommendations.32,33 Moreover, health workers are
heavily concentrated in urban areas, and in this instance
Ebola devastated an already deﬁcient workforce, killing
more than 500 health workers through April, 2015.29
Human resource shortages sharply curtailed health care
beyond Ebola. Fearing infection and without the necessary
personal protective equipment and safety protocol training,
many health workers stayed away from their hospitals and
clinics, as did ill patients, fearing contagion. Short of staﬀ
or unprepared for Ebola patients they received, many
health facilities closed. Governments concentrated scarce
health resources on the Ebola emergency. During the
outbreak, more deaths probably ensued from other causes
than from Ebola. Patients with Ebola received a standard of
care far less than that oﬀered in higher-income countries,
lacking basic diagnostics and ﬂuid replacement that would
have improved survival rates.34
The Ebola outbreak exposed health system fragilities:
poor infection control put health workers at risk and
dissuaded patients from seeking treatment; communitybased health workforces were insuﬃcient, and therefore
unable to detect unusual symptoms or patterns, educate
the community, or trace contacts; and public distrust
reinforced rumours, impeding behaviour change. The
Ebola epidemic taught us that recommended public
health capacities—required under the IHR but widely
ignored—are crucial in bringing health emergencies
under control, and keeping populations healthy and safe.

Global health leadership: an empowered WHO
A new global health framework
The Ebola epidemic revealed a fragmented global health
system: an ad hoc series of institutions, laws, and
strategies that do not function as a coherent whole. Ebolaaﬀected countries had neither the health infrastructure
nor specialised capacity to respond. WHO fell short of its
leadership responsibilities,30 and the IHR—the governing
legal framework—displayed deﬁciencies. Health workers
and funding needed immediately instead arrived slowly
and unpredictably.
Drawing on the lessons of Ebola, we propose a global
health framework with robust national health systems at
its foundation and an empowered WHO at its apex, well
coordinated funding and actions from many parties,
eﬀective legal methods to establish clear accountability,
www.thelancet.com Vol 385 May 9, 2015

A global health leader steers the overall direction of
epidemic response, drives consensus toward a coherent
strategy, ensures all necessary functions are satisﬁed,
and coordinates many participators. Leadership is
WHO’s primary constitutional mission—“the directing
and coordinating authority on international health
work” (article 2[a]). In emergencies, the constitution
directs the organisation to furnish “necessary aid upon
the request or acceptance of Governments” (article
2[d]).35 The IHR establishes WHO as the governing
institution charged with preventing and responding to
global health emergencies.
The Ebola outbreak in west Africa should have been the
type of moment for which WHO was created. Instead, the
epidemic exposed long-understood failings. Lapses during
1903
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the early stages of Ebola provoked justiﬁed criticism and
created a unique impetus for reform. At its special session
in January, 2015, the Executive Board embraced innovative
reforms, though neglected others.36 The reform priorities
below could enable WHO to become the global health
leader envisaged at its creation in 1948, and what the world
needs today.

Three crucial functions: technical, normative, and
operational

1904

50% composed of mandatory accessed dues. The
Secretariat should develop a time-bound plan to match
the budget’s size and composition with its essential
functions. Ultimately, member states will shoulder the
cost—either by sustainably increasing assessed contributions or in humanitarian assistance as outbreaks
spiral out of control. They should choose to empower,
rather than eviscerate, WHO.

Regional governance: speaking and acting with a
common goal

Historically, WHO excelled in its technical function, with
in-house expertise in addition to networks of scientists
and collaborating centres. WHO scientiﬁc guidelines
and in-country assistance are highly respected. In
May, 2011, however, WHO experienced a half-billion
dollar budget cut, losing 300 headquarter jobs.37,38 WHO’s
emergency response unit lost nearly two-thirds of its
staﬀ;39 the Regional Oﬃce for Africa (AFRO) lost nine of
12 emergency response specialists.4 Restoring trust in
WHO’s unmatched technical skills will require the
organisation to attract and retain the highest calibre
scientiﬁc personnel.
WHO was founded as a normative organisation
uniquely positioned for global health diplomacy, with
unparalleled treaty-making powers. Yet in 65 years of
existence, it has negotiated only two major treaties, the
IHR and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
WHO should exercise its constitutional powers to set
priorities, mobilise action, and monitor and promote
compliance with global norms.40
WHO’s operational function has been most controversial, with some experts proposing a separate
organisation to lead operations.41 Yet, diluting WHO’s
operational responsibilities would be an error of
judgment. No other entity can match WHO’s international
legitimacy, partnerships, ties with health ministries, or
legal authority. Structural reforms to support operational
capacities would restore WHO’s most valuable yet
diminished asset, trust.

The poor cohesiveness between headquarters and AFRO
became evident during Ebola. AFRO did not convene
health ministers or open a regional coordination centre
until 3 months after Ebola was conﬁrmed in Guinea; the
Guinea country oﬃce reportedly impeded aid and
technical assistance; and Assistant Director-General Bruce
Aylward notiﬁed the Director-General that international
partners believed WHO was “compromising rather than
aiding” the mission.3,4,47 A representative of Médecins Sans
Frontières said, “There is no one to take responsibility,
absolutely no one, since the beginning of the crisis”.39
A strong regional framework begins with top-quality,
accountable leaders working constructively with
partners. Yet WHO’s Regional Committees nominate
the Regional Director, with the Executive Board rubberstamping their appointments.48 This process makes
directors accountable ﬁrst to their region’s health
ministers, rather than headquarters, impeding WHO’s
ability to speak and act as a single organisation.
WHO should return to its constitutional origins,
whereby the Executive Board appoints regional directors.35
A search committee would create a short-list, using
transparent selection criteria.48 Regions should, as in
Europe, adopt a code of conduct to guide the nomination
process.49 These reforms would ensure qualiﬁed regional
directors, well versed in their region’s priorities, but
accountable to headquarters and committed to WHO’s
global priorities and programme of work.50,51

Funding commensurate with a global mandate

Civil society engagement

As of March, 2015, Ebola was on track to cost $6 billion
in direct expenses and at least $15 billion in economic
losses.26,42,43 Recovery plans for Guinea, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone developed in April, 2015, total more than
$4·5 billion over the next several years.44–46 The direct
costs alone amount to 3 years of funding for WHO, and
is well over 20 times the cost of WHO’s emergency
response cuts in its 2014–15 budget.38
Inadequate epidemic preparedness funding has been,
and will continue to be, unwise. The WHO 2014–15
budget of less than $4 billion is wholly incommensurate
with its worldwide responsibilities. Further, WHO
depends on voluntary contributions for nearly 80% of its
budget, with most contributions earmarked.38 Member
states should act as stakeholders in the organisation’s
success by doubling its budget over 5 years, with at least

WHO, as an intergovernmental agency, has an uncertain
relationship with non-state parties.52 When dealing with
the private sector in particular, it needs to avoid conﬂicts
of interest. Conﬂict management alone, however, cannot
lift WHO into the modern era. The AIDS pandemic
showed the power of civil society advocacy and ingenuity.
To participate in WHO governance forums, civil society
organisations must enter into “oﬃcial relations” with
WHO, requiring them to be “international in membership
and/or scope”, which excludes poorer, grassroots
organisations based in developing countries.52 Even if
civil society organisations are in oﬃcial relations, they
cannot fully have their voices heard, which underscores
the Director-General’s 2013 observation, “no proactive,
structured means [exist] through which WHO can seek
the views of relevant [non-governmental organisations].”53
www.thelancet.com Vol 385 May 9, 2015
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The World Health Assembly should enable civil society
organisations to participate meaningfully in WHO policy
making, including through hearings, focus groups, and
input into governance decisions. Newer public–private
partnerships (Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria and GAVI Alliance) and UNAIDS include civil
society representation on their governing boards—a
useful model for WHO.

Human resources
The Executive Board recognised “WHO’s human
resources systems and processes slowed down the
response to Ebola”,36 calling for reform of recruitment,
training, performance reviews, and mobility policies, and
aﬃrming the Director-General’s authority over regional
and country staﬀ.36 WHO’s managerial and leadership
capabilities need to be “valued in the same way as
technical capability”.54 Skills in law, diplomacy, trade,
economics, and anthropology are crucial to epidemic
preparedness. Only 3% of WHO non-support staﬀ have
these non-medical specialisations.55

Stakeholders
In a well functioning global health system, all parties would
perform functions suited to their mandate, working
cooperatively, and supporting national ownership. International organisations, states, non-governmental organisations, and the private sector are pivotal stakeholders.

UN
In September, 2014, the UN assumed leadership in the
Ebola response as WHO ﬂoundered. For the ﬁrst time,
the Security Council declared an outbreak a “threat to
international peace and security”.16 The Council’s binding
resolution directed states to lift border and travel
restrictions and maintain transportation links. A day after
the Security Council resolution, the Secretary-General
created UNMEER, the ﬁrst UN mission to respond to
a public health emergency. Charged with “eﬀective
ground-level leadership and operational direction”,17
UNMEER coordinated participants and adopted
anthropological-based strategies to change behaviour.56
The UN’s historic action galvanised political support.
By contrast with IHR recommendations, Security
Council resolutions are legally binding, with members
agreeing “to accept and carry out [the Security Council’s]
decisions”.57 If UN action becomes a staple of global
health security in the future, the Security Council could
specify states’ humanitarian responsibilities, which could
improve compliance. Raising epidemic response to a
level of high politics—through the UN, G7, or G20—
could transform the global response.

and loans extend beyond the direct Ebola response,
rebuilding health systems, social safety nets, and
agriculture.58 The World Bank galvanised political support
by estimating the economic harms.60 In October, the
World Bank’s President, Jim Yong Kim, proposed a global
pandemic emergency facility, discussed later in this paper.
The Bank’s role in health and development is distinct
from other international organisations. With unique
strengths in economic acumen, ﬁnancial sector networks,
and disbursement of funding across sectors, it is uniquely
positioned to mobilise multisectoral ﬁnancing, calculate
the economic costs of failures in pandemic preparedness,
and develop innovative ﬁnancing mechanisms.

States
States hold a primary duty to safeguard their population’s
health, with a shared international responsibility to ﬁll
gaps in capacity. International ﬁnancial assistance for
Ebola came mainly from wealthier states: the USA
contributed more than $1 billion, with substantial
bilateral support from France, Germany, and the UK.61
The Obama Administration’s Global Health Security
Agenda, with 44 partner countries, is injecting new
resources to prevent and mitigate future health threats.62
Lower-income countries including Cuba and Uganda
oﬀered human resources and skills.63,64 The African
Union Support to Ebola Outbreak in West Africa
(ASEOWA) sent more than 800 health workers.65 Yet
some states imposed travel restrictions and quarantines
contrary to the demands of WHO and the UN, hindering
the response. In an interconnected world, every state has
a national security interest in containing novel pathogens
that can transcend borders.

Non-governmental organisations: Médecins Sans
Frontières
Médecins Sans Frontières—along with others, including
Partners In Health and Samaritan’s Purse—showed the
importance of non-governmental organisations by
leading the medical response and sounding a global
alert. Médecins Sans Frontières deployed more than
1300 international and 4000 local staﬀ.66 The organisation
admitted 8100 patients to its eight treatment centres
by mid-February. Of nearly 5000 conﬁrmed cases,
2300 survived.67 Médecins Sans Frontières organised
community-based teams to educate the public and to
trace contacts.68 Its courage came with a price, as
27 members of staﬀ became infected, mostly in the
community.66 In future outbreaks, until health systems
can stand on their own, international non-governmental
organisations will remain invaluable service providers
and independent sources of information.

The World Bank

Private sector

The World Bank made major contributions, initially
$200 million in August, 2014, with its total funding
exceeding $1·6 billion by mid-April, 2015.58,59 These grants

When the Ebola outbreak began, despite periodic
previous outbreaks, no approved vaccines or treatments
had been developed. Pharmaceutical companies had

www.thelancet.com Vol 385 May 9, 2015
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Panel: The reform agenda: assuring global health security
An empowered WHO
Funding: commensurate with global mandate and under Director-General’s control
Technical excellence: diverse staﬀ with multisectoral capabilities
Operational capacities: rapid deployment of economic and human resources
Normative standards: setting priorities and ensuring compliance
Regional oﬃces: regional knowledge and consistency with headquarters
Engaging non-state parties: harnessing the potential of civil society
National health capacities
Global health workforce reserve
Emergency contingency fund
Pandemic emergency facility
International health systems fund
Strengthening the International Health Regulations
Stronger state duties to build core capacities
Revise algorithm for declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
Independent monitoring and transparency
Compliance enhancing mechanisms

little incentive to invest in countermeasures for
unpredictable outbreaks and in poor countries. Even
major government and philanthropic funders often
overlooked diseases with low global burdens. The Ebola
epidemic should change these incentive structures, with
public–private partnerships needed to pursue solutions
for diseases with epidemic potential, however rare.69 The
private sector’s contribution to pandemic preparedness
extends beyond medical countermeasures to information
technology (eg, mobile telephones, apps, and data
systems), logistics (eg, transporting equipment and
supplies), and innovative ﬁnancing (eg, the insurance
and ﬁnancial sectors).

International Health Regulations: the governing
legal framework
International law and national implementing legislation
can be powerful means for a more eﬀective global health
system. The IHR, the governing instrument for global
health security, displayed ﬂaws during the Ebola
outbreak. States widely ignored its capacity-building
mandates. After the 2009 inﬂuenza A H1N1 pandemic,
the WHO independent Review Committee warned that
the world was not on track to meet core capacities.
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had not even reported
their progress.70 The IHR contains permissive language
on capacity building, requiring states “to collaborate with
each other, to the extent possible.”71 The World Health
Assembly should revise the IHR to provide concrete
steps for building health system capacities. A donor
conference, similar to the Global Fund’s replenishment
mechanism, could infuse funding toward that goal.72
States disregarded not only the IHR’s capacity building
mandate, but also the Director-General’s temporary IHR
recommendations.14 Some governments lacked the
1906

capacity to comply, with the Director-General
unrealistically, in our opinion, asking post-conﬂict states
with some of the world’s weakest infrastructure and
most poorly ﬁnanced health systems to themselves
ensure suﬃcient treatment centres, trained staﬀ, and
protective equipment. Other states merely chose not to
comply, for example, by imposing quarantines and travel
restrictions without scientiﬁc justiﬁcation.
The IHR should contain compliance-enhancing mechanisms, including independent monitoring of country
performance and public reporting. Currently, states assess
their own compliance and the WHO database merely
aggregates country data. An independent certiﬁcation-ofcompliance system, as occurs with polio eradication,
could hold states to account. The World Health Assembly
should update the IHR to ensure independence, rigorous
assessment, and transparency.72 The Assembly should also
amend the IHR’s decision instrument on when to declare
a PHEIC (panel) to include fragile health systems,
behavioural practices, and public distrust.
The Director-General’s sole power to call an Emergency
Committee meeting and declare a PHEIC could be
supplemented by an independent working group,
regularly assessing potential global health threats,
reporting publicly, and recommending that the DirectorGeneral convene an Emergency Committee.34 To
improve transparency, the Emergency Committee or the
Director-General should provide reasons for their
decisions, as well as a timeline of WHO’s response and
resource mobilisation.

Mobilising human and ﬁnancial resources:
preparing for a crisis
The delay in mobilising ﬁnancing and human resources
showed the heavy costs of a failure to prepare. Planning
for rapid mobilisation should be combined with
strengthening health systems to build country capacity.
The subsequent capacity-building reforms would better
ensure health security, both regionally and worldwide.

Global health workforce reserve
Health worker shortages, combined with the human
resource-intense response, demanded international
support. Yet the ﬂow of health workers was far beneath
the need. In late October, 2014, part of the epidemic’s
worst phase, there was “a huge gap” in trained workers,
with the UN estimating 1000 foreign health workers still
needed.73 As Ebola peaked in December in Sierra Leone,
treatment centres still had staﬀ deﬁciencies.74
WHO does not have staﬀ to serve as front-line service
providers, and developing this capacity would be costly
and ineﬃcient. Rather, the organisation should draw
human resources from networks such as the Global
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN)—a
collaboration of institutions, which pools human
resources and equipment.36,75 WHO should certify
reserve workforce outbreak response and health
www.thelancet.com Vol 385 May 9, 2015
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emergency competencies. Importantly, well trained
health workers would serve their communities,
deployed internationally only when needed to quell a
major outbreak.
Obstacles to rapid deployment should be removed,
such as national registration or licensing, liability, and
visa delays. Workers should be fairly compensated, with
safe working conditions. If workers become ill, WHO
should ensure treatment in country or through medical
evacuation.

Emergency contingency fund
By the end of July, 2014, WHO reported that only
$7 million had been contributed to combat Ebola.12 Even
when funds were promised, large gaps remained between
commitments and disbursements.76 Funding has now
reached billions of dollars. Yet by early 2015, there were
already signs of donor fatigue.77 The slow initial response
enabled Ebola to escalate, whereas political will could
now wane during the ﬁnal crucial phases.
The outbreak reminded us that mobilising funds only
after a crisis hits is ineﬀective. WHO never implemented
the 2011 IHR Review Committee recommendation for a
standing $100 million contingency fund to be released
in a declared emergency.70 The 2015 Executive Board,
however, directed the Director-General to report to the
World Health Assembly on more expansive funding
needs, “the preparedness, surveillance and response
work of WHO”.36 A contingency fund would have to
include new resources so it does not erode the agency’s
overall budget. In view of the experience with Ebola, the
fund will have to go above the $100 million initially
proposed.

A pandemic emergency facility
The World Bank has proposed a pandemic emergency
facility to fund future pandemic response, including
health workers, medicines, supplies, and information
systems. The facility would frontload funds to be available
in a pandemic, supported by long-term donor pledges
and the private sector.78 By use of an insurance model, for
example, states and development partners would insure
against epidemic risks, with premiums lowered as
preparedness improves.79 Insurance payouts would be
triggered by a predeﬁned emergency event. This model
takes advantage of state and private interests in lowering
future risks of a public health crisis.

International health system fund
Neither the WHO contingency fund nor the World
Bank’s emergency facility would robustly fund the IHR’s
core capacities or health systems. Disease-speciﬁc
initiatives such as the Global Fund and GAVI have
improved health systems, but remain insuﬃcient.
Health economists estimate that one-third to one-half
of new health ﬁnancing should be directed to health
system strengthening,80,81 yet less than 7% of international
www.thelancet.com Vol 385 May 9, 2015

funds are devoted to that goal.82 Without a new approach,
international funding will not meet health systemstrengthening needs. Therefore, we propose a multibillion dollar international health systems fund.83 The
Fund could be under the purview of the Global Fund,
with an expanded mandate, increased funding, and
governance reforms to ensure broad expertise and
participation. States could pay dues assessed at levels
based on UN and WHO contributions, the equitable
contributions framework,84 or other metrics, with
reciprocal national investments.
Alternatively, the International Health System Fund
could be housed under a new public–private partnership,
including key international organisations (eg, WHO and
the World Bank), governments, civil society, and
communities. The Global Fund and GAVI chairs could
be board members, ensuring synergy among the funds.
The new Fund could borrow features from both global
health funds, such as the Global Fund’s inclusive Country
Coordination Mechanisms, human rights strategy, and
focus on marginalised populations, along with GAVI’s
coﬁnancing requirement.

The need to act now
Action now on WHO and other reforms to the global
health system is crucial, before the political moment
passes. The World Health Assembly should aﬃrm its
commitment to the workforce reserve and contingency
fund, even as details may require further development.
It should call for the Director-General to develop a
needs-based budget, as well as options for reform
of regional governance and deepened civil society
engagement, with ﬁnal decisions next year. The Global
Fund and GAVI Board could hold a joint board meeting
to determine the possibility of their incorporating an
international health system fund. If they decline, the
UN should launch this Fund, replicating its catalytic
role for the Global Fund.85

A global health system for all
The Ebola outbreak in west Africa revealed the
incoherence and inequity of the global health system.
Impoverished communities and countries suﬀer most,
but everyone is at risk. The west African crisis, combined
with the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals,
provides a rare political opportunity for sweeping
reforms. Robust national health systems, a 21st century
WHO, a strong IHR with state compliance, and
sustainable human and ﬁnancial resources would
transform the global health system. These reforms
would not only keep populations secure against
pandemic threats, but would also ensure health and
safety for all needs through rights-based universal health
coverage. This is a global health framework that is
achievable in the aftermath of a tragic epidemic that
needlessly took more than 10 000 lives in one of the
world’s poorest regions.
1907
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Warnings and delayed response
WHO response

Fear, stigma, and separation

WHO and MSF warnings

March 25, 2014: WHO tweets “Ebola
has always remained a very localised
event”

March 31, 2014: MSF warns of an
“epidemic of a magnitude never
seen before”

International: outside the epicentre

April 14, 2014: WHO warns: we are
seeing “tip of the iceberg,” need
“drastic” change in course

Mid-June, 2014: WHO Assistant
Director-General says declaring a PHEIC
could be viewed as a “hostile act”

June 4, 2014: WHO official says
PHEIC should be a “last resort”

June 21, 2014: MSF warns: Ebola
“out of control”, calls for “massive
deployment of resources”

Late July, 2014: MSF President urges
WHO Director-General to declare
Ebola a PHEIC

April 16, 2015: WHO issues statement
acknowledging failings, then 4 days later
issues "corrected" toned-down statement

Aug 8, 2014: WHO Director-General
declares PHEIC

Most affected states (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone)

August, 2014: Many African countries
establish travel bans, as major
international airlines suspend flights

Sept 16, 2014: Eight health officials
and journalists conducting Ebola
education session killed in Guinea

Aug 20, 2014: 15-year-old Liberian boy
killed at protest during the cordon
sanitaire in West Point, Monrovia

Oct 21, 2014: USA limits entry from
affected states to five airports for
enhanced entry screening

Sept 19, 2014: Sierra Leone starts 3-day
national lockdown to identify cases and
educate public

October–November, 2014: Growing
calls for travel ban in the USA, but
President Obama resists

Oct 24, 2014: Nurse returning from Sierra Leone quarantined
in New Jersey, USA, later released, only to be quarantined in
Maine until a judge found quarantine order unlawful

Dec 10, 2014: As Time magazine names “Ebola fighters”
Person of the Year, WHO reports 342 health workers have died,
a toll that exceeded 500 by April, 2015

Oct 28, 2014: Australia becomes first
developed country to issue a travel ban

Late 2014: Cases decline in Liberia and later in
Sierra Leone: community resourcefulness and
international mobilisation showing results

Progression of the epidemic
Most affected states (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone)
International spread beyond most affected states
The toll rises

Sept 23, 2014: CDC warns of up to
1·4 million cases by Jan 20, 2015

Figure appendix: Timeline of Ebola virus disease progress in west Africa
PHEIC=Public Health Emergency Of International Concern. MSF=Médicine Sans Frontièrs. UNMEER=UN Mission for Emergency Ebola Response.

December 2013: Index patient,
Emile Ouamouno, dies in Guinea, but
Ebola goes undetected

Sept 20, 2014: Thomas Eric Duncan, who contracted Ebola
in Liberia, arrives in Dallas, TX, USA, but is undiagnosed until
Sept 30; two nurses who treated him would become infected

Dec 30, 2014: Nurse returning from Sierra
Leone is diagnosed with Ebola in the UK
March–May, 2014: Ebola confirmed:
March 21 in Guinea; March 23 in
Liberia; late May in Sierra Leone

March 12, 2015: Ebola’s death toll
tops 10 000 people

Oct 7, 2014: Nursing assistant who treated medically
evacuated patient in Spain diagnosed with Ebola, the
first reported transmission outside west Africa

July 26–27, 2014: 2 US aid workers
contract Ebola in Liberia then medically
evacuated to Atlanta, GA, USA
Aug 11, 2014: Ebola death toll
exceeds 1000 people

July 25, 2014: Ebola confirmed in Lagos, Nigeria (virus
spreads to 19 more people, resulting in eight deaths
before WHO declares Nigeria Ebola-free on Oct 20)

Oct 23, 2014:
• Ebola confirmed in Mali but quickly contained, with a
separate transmission in mid-November
• Health worker in New York City, NY, USA, tests positive
for Ebola after returning from Guinea and faces vilification,
with case contributing to atmosphere of fear

Late January, 2015: Weekly cases fall
below 100, but then rise, with most in
Sierra Leone and Guinea

Mid-June, 2014: >100 cases being
reported per week
Mid-September, 2014:
>700 Ebola cases reported
in a single week

Aug 29, 2014:
Guinea national with Ebola arrives in
Senegal, but no further spread

April 2015: New cases fall below
40 per week

International mobilisation
Financial need and costs

NGO and private sector

World Bank

Early August, 2014: MSF begins largest “knowledge-transfer” in their
history to train health workers. By the 1-year anniversary of first confirmed
case, MSF would deploy 5300 workers and open eight treatment centres

State response

Aug 4, 2014: World Bank
pledges $200 million, the
largest pledge to that point

End of July to early-mid September, 2014: WHO and UN issue progressively higher
resource needs estimates: WHO appeals for US$71 million on July 31 and $490
million on Aug 28; UN appeals for $600 million on Sept 5 and $988 million on Sept 16
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WHO

UN
Sept 8, 2014: UK announces plan to build Ebola
treatment centre in Sierra Leone, and a month
later says it will send 750 troops to Sierra Leone

Sept 5, 2014: European
Union commits €140
million

Sept 16, 2014: President Obama
announces plans to send 3000 troops
to aid response in Liberia

Sept 19, 2014: UN Secretary-General
establishes UNMEER

Sept 18, 2014: UN Security Council
passes historic resolution calling Ebola
a threat to international peace and security

Oct 2, 2014: Cuba sends 165 health
workers to Sierra Leone, with more
to follow in the region

Oct 8, 2014: World Bank estimates that
Ebola could cost the region $32·6 billion,
a figure later revised downward

Dec 1, 2014: UNMEER targets for 70% safe
burials and 70% new patients in treatment
centres met in most of region

Early 2015: First Ebola
vaccine clinical trials
begin in west Africa

Dec 11, 2014: Congress passes President Obama’s Ebola
supplemental appropriations request, funding the Global
Health Security Agenda (launched in February, 2014)

January, 2015: UN special envoy on Ebola reports
that the epidemic has cost $4 billion, as UN
appeals for another $1 billion through June, 2015

Jan 25, 2015: WHO Executive
Board passes Ebola resolution
calling for several major reforms

February, 2015: WHO reports that
medical teams from 40 organisations
had responded

February, 2015: By mid-February,
>800 African Union health workers
have participated in the Ebola response

March 12, 2015: UN Development
Group estimates Ebola will cost west
Africa $14·7–$19·7 billion (2014–17)

March 3, 2015: Liberian President
Johnson Sirleaf calls for “Marshall Plan”
for regional recovery

May, 2015: World Health Assembly to
convene to consider WHO reforms,
learning the lessons of Ebola

April 28, 2015: WHO launches Strategic Response
Plan outlining activities planned through 2015 to
stop transmission of Ebola in affected countries

December, 2015: UN high-level
panel on the global response to health
crises to provide recommendations

